Last weekend’s European Parliament elections were a disaster for French president Emmanuel Macron. The ascendant far-right National Rally, led by anti-immigrant populist Marine Le Pen, took more than 31 percent of the vote, while Macron’s coalition took in under 15 percent and other mainstream parties struggled mightily as well. Then, in a highly surprising move just hours after returns rolled in, Macron announced new legislative elections to be held on June 30 and July 7. It’s a high-stakes gamble: Macron, deeply unpopular, is betting that while the country’s restive voters may have wanted to send him a message, they will be less enthusiastic about handing the party’s leader, Marine Le Pen, and her media-savvy young protégé, Jordan Bardella, control of France’s National Assembly ahead of presidential elections in 2027. (Macron, who has beaten Le Pen handily in the last two elections, is term-limited.) The announcement set off days of political drama, turmoil, and protests in France. The center-right Republicans attempted to oust their leader, Éric Ciotti, after he called for an alliance with the National Rally, while several left-wing factions united in an effort to stop the far right. Now the big questions are whether Macron has made a grave miscalculation — and whether Le Pen’s party is on the verge of its biggest victory yet.
Mujtaba Rahman is the managing director of the Europe division at the risk consultancy Eurasia Group and a keen observer of French politics. I spoke with him about what Macron is thinking, how the next few weeks might play out, and why the French political center is collapsing.
Does anyone other than Macron think calling these elections was a good idea?
I think Macron’s allies believe it would have been impossible for him to continue governing with 15 percent of the vote and a 17-point gap with the far right in the European elections. Passage of the budget would have been very challenging in 2025, and there was a very high probability of censure motions that would’ve potentially precipitated the fall of his government later in the year. So I think in Macron’s imagination, he was getting ahead of an inevitability, and better for him to seize the initiative and take the fight to Le Pen and the opposition than have them dictate the likelihood of an early election by engineering these votes of confidence that could ultimately have resulted in the collapse of his government.
Now, it’s true that constitutionally, it’s up to Macron to call an election. And it’s true that in the face of a censure motion, he could fire his prime minister, he could reshuffle his government, he could avoid an election. But I think the general sense is there would be a volley of censure motions from the opposition, and at some point, he would’ve been obliged to call one.
The final thing I would say here is even if Le Pen delivers a majority in the National Assembly, the one thing Macron may then be able to do is constrain her because he’ll still be in the Élysée. Is it better to have an open boulevard for Le Pen to win both the Élysée and deliver a majority in the National Assembly in 2027 or better that the far right comes to power earlier, but is more constrained by virtue of the fact that Macron would still be president?
I hadn’t realized the extent to which he’d be painted into a corner if he didn’t make this move now.
It all hangs on the Republicans, and they are torn between their hatred of Macron and their fear of an early election. It’s a small group. It’s 61 MPs or deputies in the National Assembly, but they’re horribly divided. It’s effectively no longer a political party; it’s a group of self-serving entrepreneurs.
And they just kicked out their leader, right?
Yeah, they booted out their leader because he tried to do a deal with the far right that they didn’t agree to. But I think there was a very substantial risk that the government would fall. Not through the Olympics, because Macron wanted to maintain stability. It was either going to happen now or later in the year. And as I say, it was our base case that there would be an early election this year — we had it at a 60 percent probability. I thought it would happen in September, October. But I do think there was a major risk, and I think Macron saw that risk and that’s what he was trying to get in front of.
Another big development last week was that four left-wing parties, who are usually at odds with each other, formed a unified coalition to block the far right. First of all, do you think this coalition could realistically prevent the National Rally from gaining a majority? And if they do perform well, what does that mean for Macron and his future?
The left is horribly divided. They’ve got the communists, the Trotskyites, the Greens, this group called LF — La France Insoumise, which is Mélenchon’s group — and then they’ve got the moderate center-left social democrats. So it’s a kind of rainbow arrangement between a group of factions that aren’t ideologically aligned on anything.
Sounds like a classic “left” problem.
Yeah, exactly. So they won’t deliver a majority, but what they might be able to do is to prevent Le Pen delivering a majority. And I think if you look at the contours of their program that they’ve articulated, it’s basically a set of populist giveaways that are designed to compete with the populist giveaways Le Pen is offering the electorate. The program they’re articulating — they won’t be able to implement it because they won’t even be able to agree on a prime minister that would lead an administration if they were to deliver a majority. You’d have four or five parties that would need to decide who the PM should be, and I don’t think they’d be able to do that. This is more to prevent Le Pen and increase the likelihood that you end up in a hung Parliament, which is where I think this is going.
So you don’t think the National Rally will gain a majority?
It’s a non-negligible risk — 30 percent or thereabouts. They’ve got 88 MPs, and they delivered the highest-ever result in a European election. This isn’t a bushfire that started yesterday. The performance of the far right in France has been structurally improving over the course of the last 20 years. Macron, more than anyone, sees that trend line. So it’s not inconceivable that Le Pen doubles her number of MPs, and it’s not inconceivable she gets a majority. But I think it’s more likely to be a hung Parliament that’s effectively paralyzed and deadlocked with no clear way through for the far right, the hard left, or the center. That’s probably a more realistic equilibrium than a far-right majority, a hard-left majority, or Macron somehow convincing people over the next three weeks that they should be less angry than they were on Sunday last week when they told him to get lost.
Convincing people to be less angry is not one of his great talents.
Exactly.
Wouldn’t these leftist parties, or other minor parties that are banding against Le Pen & Co., have a lot of leverage over Macron if they do manage to help block a National Rally majority?
It’s bad news for Macron. The far left is at 28 percent, Macron’s at 18 percent, and the far right’s at 31 to 33 percent in the latest polls. I think where this is going is that if you’re a center-left voter, you have less confidence that voting Macron is enough to stop Le Pen, and so you are more inclined to vote for the hard left, where you’d be blocking the far right. And if you are a center-right voter, you have less confidence that Macron can prevent the hard left, and so you vote the far right to prevent the hard left. So you’re in a situation where centrist voters are moving to the extreme because they have less confidence that the center can prevent the extremes.
To put this into context, if you think about France before Macron came to power in 2017, it was basically center right, center left, and a small kind of far right in the middle. Macron comes to power and he destroys the center right, destroys the center left, and the middle grows. And then you end up in these three blocks: hard left, far right, and center. And I think where France is probably going now is two blocks again, but both more extreme. So a left that’s more hard left, a right that’s farther to the right, and a very squeezed center.
And so I don’t think there’s a majority there to the left, and I don’t probably think there’s a majority there for the far right, but I don’t think there’s a majority there for the center either. And that’s that deadlock-paralysis scenario where you are heading to where there’s no ability really for any side to govern effectively.
Right-wing populists have been successful all over Europe recently. But France stands out as the only major western democratic country where they might actually be a governing majority soon. What is it about the country, or Macron, that’s different? He’s often seen as arrogant and insular.
In some ways, Macron is reaping the seeds he sowed back in 2017 by destroying the traditional party system in France. He fragmented the right. He fragmented the left. He didn’t build a political party himself. There’s no chain of succession in Macron’s party.
It’s a one-man band.
Yeah. There’s no mechanism to elect a successor. It’s not a real party. There are no grassroots, there are no local barons, there’s no party structure. It’s effectively him. So structurally, that has created some of this risk that we’re now seeing manifest. I do think Macron is obviously Jupiterian — he’s very distant, quite arrogant. He uses language that doesn’t connect to people and that people readily understand. So he’s a bit distant and a bit removed from the electorate. That’s also a problem.
So part of it is his personal style, part of it is the seeds he sowed. But I think the geopolitical context has ultimately worked against him as it has other leaders in Europe. When Macron won power, he did manage to implement reforms that reduced unemployment, that improved the fiscal situation, the economic situation. But there was a major impact on public finances in Europe and all over the world as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. There was a major impact on cost of living and inflation as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
I think that overall context is what has resulted in the surge of the far right alongside Le Pen “legitimizing” herself. She has 88 deputies in the National Assembly. They turn up and they vote. They’re not xenophobic, they’re not homophobic, they’re not antisemitic, they don’t say stupid things. They behave. They’re “professional.” That’s created the sense that they are now within the system. This idea of Le Pen being “normalized” is outdated. She’s popular, and her MPs turn up and they play the game. Things haven’t broken since she’s been in the National Assembly. If anything, she has looked professional, and her operators looked professional. And that’s also increased, I think, the comfort level of the electorate to give her a chance.
It strikes me that Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister elected in 2022, was seen as a pretty extreme far right, and there were lots of warnings about her from Western Europe and the U.S. as well …
And she did become more constructive, but Meloni’s program out of power was nowhere near as extreme as Le Pen’s. If you look at Le Pen’s European program, there’s a major contradiction, because she doesn’t talk about Euro exit, but all of the elements of her policy platform are fundamentally and totally incompatible with E.U. membership. So it’s not “exit by the front door” — it may be “exit by the back door.” I don’t think she wants to leave. But there will be a reckoning between her and the E.U. because if she does deliver a majority and Bardella is prime minister, how that relationship with Europe works out is not at all obvious because the platform is so Euro-skeptic and so anti-European.
What I meant, though, is that people had been warning about Meloni, she came to power, and she’s been seen as more moderate than expected, at least in some ways. So perhaps Le Pen and Bardella can tell voters, “Look, they fear-mongered about her, and it turned out all right.”
Yeah, I agree.
I’ve seen speculation that part of Macron’s strategy is if the National Rally does get a majority and they start governing, people will see them in action, see how chaotic they are when they actually have responsibility, and turn away from them in 2027. What do you make of that possibility?
There’s a contradiction. Because if they come in and they’re sensible, they further legitimize themselves and increase the probability they win both the Élysée and the National Assembly in 2027. If they’re chaotic, it’s not clear who loses, Le Pen or Macron. They’ll blame Macron for the chaos, they’ll blame the E.U., they’ll blame market participants. If things go well, they stand to benefit. If things go badly, Macron could also be held accountable and responsible. And the point here, I think, is there’s a theoretical division of labor that everyone talks about between the Élysée and the government, which is that Macron would be in charge of foreign defense and European policy and Le Pen would be in charge of domestic policy. But those two things often intersect.
So as an example, Macron says, “We’re going to send troops into Ukraine, and I believe Ukraine should be a member of the E.U.” Well, to do both of those things, you need to pass legislation and you need a majority in the National Assembly, which he won’t have. So Macron’s Europe agenda can run into the sun very quickly if there’s a government that’s ideologically opposed to the kind of things he’s trying to do.
The lose-lose hurts both of them. It’s not obvious that they come in and it’s a total car crash, they’re the ones that are completely hurt and Macron gets off scot-free. Equally conceivable is that they come in, they do all of these things, they undermine themselves, but they also massively undermine Macron’s agenda and both constituencies lose. So this is a mutual constraint. It hurts Macron as much as it hurts Le Pen if things go badly. And if things go well, there’s time to benefit and they run through to ’27. So this idea where you get this beautiful asymmetry that they come in, they do a bunch of crazy things and they’re held responsible, and Macron benefits strikes me as too easy.
Yeah, it seems fanciful.
The world’s going to be more complicated, I suspect. That’s why I think this is a major gamble. There is a material risk of bad outcomes here that hurt France, the stability of France, the stability of Europe, the stability of both France and E.U. to support Ukraine. They hurt Macron just as much as they may hurt Le Pen. There are no winners from this and there are many losers.
On that comforting note, I’ll let you go.
Enjoy the shitshow, and then we’ll be laughing at you in November.
Oh God, don’t remind me.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
